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RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS
UNDER THE NEBRASKA POST CONVICTION ACT
Many of the rules and procedures of criminal law, especially
in regard to the right to counsel, are being rapidly reshaped. While
much of this reformation is being accomplished by the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court,1 a good deal of the change, particularly in post conviction review, 2 is coming from the states3
themselves.
Nebraska passed a Post Conviction Act 4 in 1965 that is somewhat akin to the federal post conviction review proceeding.5 The
Act does not provide an avenue for repetitious review 6 but instead
allows the defendant a post conviction review on the basis of conT
stitutional changes that have emerged since his conviction.
I

2

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See Comment, Post Conviction Remedies, 46 NEB. L. Rv. 135, 137-138
(1967) for a survey of state post conviction remedies.

This was not always the case, as Justice Harlan noted in his concurring
opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963), when,
after noting the change in right to counsel requirements, he stated:
"This evolution, however, appears not to have been fully recognized
by many state courts, in this instance charged with the front-line
responsibility for the enforcement of constitutional rights."
4 NER. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3001-29-3004 (Supp. 1965).
5 It was noted in State v. Parker, 180 Neb. 707, 711, 144 N.W.2d 525, 527
(1966) that: "The law relating to post conviction procedure, sections
29-3001 to 29-3004, R.S. Supp., 1965, is quite new. In many of its aspects
it is similar to the Federal Statute, Title 28 U.S.C.A., Sec. 2255, p. 563."
In State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 696, 698-99, 144 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1966).
it was stated that: "The Nebraska Act is broader than the federal act
as to the basis for relief."
6 "A defendant who has taken an appeal from his conviction cannot
secure a second review of the identical propositions advanced in such
appeal by resort to a post conviction procedure." State v. Newman,
181 Neb. 588, 589, 150 N.W.2d 113, 114 (1967).
7 This facet of the Act is, of course, very important as it determines the
scope of review allowed. In State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 696, 699, 144
N.W.2d 435, 437 (1965), the court stated: "It is our conclusion that it
was not the intent of the Nebraska Legislature to equate our Post
Conviction Act literally with section 2255 of the Federal Act, but rather
that it was designed to meet modern judicial requirements, and afford
an adequate corrective process for hearing and determining alleged
violations of federal and state constitutional guarantees in the developing areas of their emergence." (emphasis added). Some broader
wording appears in State v. Sheldon, 181 Neb. 360, 148 N.W.2d 301
(1967) and State v. O'Kelly, 181 Neb. 618, 150 N.W.2d 117 (1967)
which allow the application of the Act for a "miscarriage of justice."
3

COMVIENTS
In his motion for a review of the conviction, the defendant must
allege facts8 that would raise constitutional questions about the
conviction. His conclusions9 as to his "wrongful" detention ° are
not sufficient. At this point an evidentiary hearing may be granted,
and if a denial of constitutional guarantees is discovered, the prisoner shall have his judgment set aside and either be discharged or
resentenced. The order entered is considered a final judgment, and
At the time of the writing of this article, the "emergence doctrine"
had not yet been clearly accepted for the Nebraska Act, but a case
was pending on the subject. In arguing for such a doctrine, the state's
brief in that case outlined the problem area as follows: "The logic of
this rule would seem to be irrefutable; the post conviction procedure
is not intended to give an appellant a second appeal or to serve as a
substitute for an appeal. This procedure should be restricted strictly
to constitutional rights newly declared subsequently to a defendant's
conviction and specifically declared to have retroactive effect to include
viiolations involved in his conviction but not recognized as such at
that time. In the present case, illegal search and seizure was clearly
recognized as a violation of a constitutional right at the time of
appellant's trial and original appeal and to go into the matter now
would, in effect, give every convicted defendant a second go around
to raise all claimed violations of constitutional rights which had been
available to him at the time of his original appeal despite the fact no
new law had emerged in the meantime." Brief for Appellee at 10-11,
State v. Losieau, No. 36643, filed April 7, 1967. The case has since been
decided, with the court deciding in favor of the "emergence doctrine."
State v. Losieau, 182 Neb. 367, 154 N.W.2d 762 (1967).
8 "A mere declaration or self-serving statement by a prisoner that
his constitutional rights were violated does not entitle him to a hearing on a motion to vacate his conviction or sentence. He is required
to allege facts which if proved would constitute an infringement of his
constitutional rights." State v. Warner, 181 Neb. 538, 541, 149 N.W.2d
438, 440 (1967). See also State v. Sagaser, 181 Neb. 329, 148 N.W.2d
206 (1967); State v. Fowler, 182 Neb. 333, 154 N.W.2d 766 (1967); State
v. Duncan, 182 Neb. 598, 156 N.W.2d 165 (1968); State v. Raue, 182
Neb. 735, 157 N.W.2d 380 (1968).
9 "The pleading of conclusions is no more acceptable in a post conviction proceeding than in any other civil proceeding." State v. Erving,
180 Neb. 680, 685, 144 N.W.2d 424, 428 (1966).
10 With due regard for the necessity of post conviction remedies, P. A.
Maynard, an Asst. Atty. Gen. for the State of Michigan, in taking a
rather pragmatic approach draws the following picture: "After the
first pangs of guilt or remorse, if any, have worn off, the prisoner
starts 'doing time.' After a while, depending upon the personality of
the prisoner, he begins to feel that he has 'done enough time' for his
crime. He feels that he has expiated his crime, and all sorts of extreme
feelings of self-pity beset and overcome him, followed by expressions
which tend to rationalize, minimize and even justify his offense."
Maynard, Post Conviction Problems and Proceduresin Michigan, 36 U.
DET. L.J. 202 (1958). Explaining this all too frequent occurrence,
Justice Thomas E. Fairchild has noted: "In my experience as a
member of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, it is rare that in ordering
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appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court. 1 The court need not
however, grant an evidentiary hearing if no facts appear from the
petition, along with the files and record of the case, to justify such
a hearing. 2 Needless to say, the remedy proves a powerful attraction to the convicted, regardless of the validity of their claims for
review.' 3

The Nebraska Act is rather liberally construed and applied in
relation to the sufficiency of the petition filed' 4 and the time at
the release of a convicted prisoner, or in ordering a new trial, we can
take any satisfaction from the thought that we have freed an innocent
person. Usually I suspect we have freed, or given a second chance, to
a guilty individual The justification is, and must be, that the court is
enforcing in this manner rules of fair procedure which, if steadfastly
maintained, will prevent injustice to others. This service to the
principles of our society far outweighs the disservice which may result
from turning loose someone who has little concern for the rights of

others." Fairchild, Post Conviction Rights and Remedies in Wisconsin,
1965 Wis. L. REv. 52, 54.
11 The accused must, however, prove his allegations at the envidentiary

hearing to be accorded relief under this act. See State v. Decker, 181
Neb. 859, 152 N.W.2d 5 (1967). Whereas denial of relief by the District
Court may be appealed whether an evidentiary hearing has been

granted or denied, only one appeal under the Act has ever resulted
in relief at the Supreme Court level and only one case has ever been
remanded for an additional evidentiary hearing. See State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W.2d 165 (1968) and State v. Fugate, 180 Neb.
701, 144 N.W.2d 412 (1966), 182 Neb. 325, 154 N.W.2d 514 (1967).
12 State v. Ronzo, 181 Neb. 16, 146 N.W.2d 576 (1966).
13 Nebraska has had enough petitions filed under the Post Conviction Act
to prove that such is the case. The Court noted in State v. Clingerman,
180 Neb. 344, 351, 142 N.W.2d 765, 770 (1966), that: "Defendant's motion
suggests he is at least reckless with the truth." The Court, in possibly
sensing such a trend, took time to emphasize that the post conviction
procedure would not prove fruitful to those defendants that were
merely "dissatisfied" with their sentence in State v. Silvacarvalho, 180
Neb. 755, 759, 145 N.W.2d 447, 449 (1966) and State v. Snyder, 180
Neb. 787, 790, 146 N.W.2d 67, 69 (1966).
14 Besides the motion, the sentencing court is allowed discretion in
adopting reasonable procedures for determining whether substantial
issues are raised from the files and records of the case also. State v.
Silvacarvalho, 180 Neb. 755, 759, 145 N.W.2d 447, 449 (1966). Most
courts take such an attitude where constitutional review is involved.
The court, in State v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 7, 15, 136 N.W.2d 847, 852
(1965), in referring to post conviction petitions, noted that: "If it
appears from the petition that it alleges defects of some substance, it
should not be summarily dismissed merely because of what may
appear in the record to the contrary. If it appears from the petition
and record and such investigation as the trial court should make, that
the defendant has been deprived of a constitutional right, the full
evidentiary hearing should be accorded."

COMMENTS
which the action may be brought. 5 It shall be the purpose of this
article, however, to consider the manner in which the right to
counsel' portion of the Act is construed and applied.
THE NEBRASKA VIEW
Before the Nebraska Post Conviction Act was passed, 17 several
United States Supreme Court decisions imposed right to counsel
requirements upon the states. The requirement that a state provide
counsel to an indigent in a criminal trial only when lack of counsel
would "constitute a denial of fundamental fairness"' 8 was replaced,

in Gideon v. Wainwright,9 with the determination that indigents
had an absolute right to appointed counsel at the state level.20 . In
Douglas v. California,21 the right to counsel for indigents was extended to the direct appeal from criminal convictions. Both Douglas
and Gideon made it clear that the highest court in the land recognized the necessity of legal talents in preparing and prosecuting a
case, 22 and they reduced the possibility of guilt or innocence being
15 The question of whether a motion could be filed under the Nebraska
Post Conviction Act before the prisoner has begun to serve his sentence due to the "prematurity" doctrine that was raised in a previous
study of this Act, Comment, Post Conviction Remedies, 46 NEB. L.REv.

135, 138 (1967), would seem to be effectively answered by the case of
State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 696, 144 N.W.2d 435 (1966), that held that
such a motion could be filed. In discounting the "prematurity" doctrine, the Court went on in that case to state: 'qn our changing concepts of criminal procedure and constitutional rights, unnecessary delay
become abhorrent. Logic, necessity, and the practical considerations
of modern jurisprudence make it imperative that historical doctrine
not outweigh effective criminal procedure." Id. at 701, 144 N.W.2d at
438. The provisions of the act may not be invoked while a direct
appeal is pending. See State v. Carr, 181 Neb. 251, 147 N.W.2d 619
(1967) and State v. Williams, 181 Neb. 692, 150 N.W.2d 260 (1967).
18 NEB. Ray. STAT.§ 29-3004 (Supp. 1965).
17 The act became effective April 12, 1965. Neb. Laws c. 145, pp. 486-87
(1965).
18 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
31 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20 See, Comment, Duty to Advise Indigent of Right to Counsel at State
Expense, 40 NEs. L. REv.161 (1960) for a perceptive and prophetic preGideon survey of the right to counsel for indigents at the state level.
21 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
22 At noted in the majority opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344-45, this need was most aply stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland
in Powell v. Alabama: "The right to be heard would be, in many cases,
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
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a determinant dependent upon financial considerations. 23 For post
conviction procedures, Douglas was the most far reaching, 24 but
even Douglas did not press for an extension of its requirement
25
beyond the direct appeal stage.
Shortly after passage of the Nebraska Act, its right to counsel
provision 26 was described as an "explicit guarantee of public-compensaed counsel ... .,,27
The Nebraska Supreme Court took a somewhat different view, however, and stated it as follows:

23

24

25

26

27

aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence." 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
"The present case, where counsel was denied petitioners on appeal,
shows that the discrimination is not between 'possibly good and obviously bad cases,' but between cases where the rich man can require the
court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits,
but a poor man cannot. There is lacking that equality demanded by
the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of
right, enjoys the benefit of counsers examination into the record,
research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while
the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that
his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent,
where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the
right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful
appeal." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
The probable effect of the Douglas case on post conviction procedures
was quickly made a subject of legal discussion by articles such as:
Comment, Right to Counsel in Criminal Post Conviction Review Proceedings, 51 CAL. L. REv. 970 (1963); and Pollak, The Supreme Court,
1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REv. 62, 105 (1963).
The Douglas decision specifically exempted post conviction procedures
from its scope but did note that judicial discretion as to appointment
of counsel in that area is allowable only "so long as the result does
not amount to a denial of due process or an 'invidious discrimination.'"
372 U.S. at 356.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3004 (Supp. 1965) provides: "The district court
may appoint an attorney or attorneys, not exceeding two, to represent
the prisoners in all proceedings under the provisions of sections 29-3001
to 29-3004 and fix their compensation as provided in section 29-1803."
Lake, The Echo of Clarence Gideon's Trumpet, 44 NEB. L. Rsv. 751,
767 (1965). Two years time, however, provided basis for the comment
that the act ". . . provides that counsel may be appointed by the district
court, but not that counsel must be appointed." Comment, Post Conviction Remedies, 46 NEB. L. REv. 135, 139 (1967).

COMMENTS
We think section 29-3004, R.S. Supp., 1965, providing the district
court may appoint an attorney or attorneys, not exceeding two, to
represent the prisoners in all proceedings under the provisions of
sections 29-3001 to 29-3004, R.S. Supp., 1965 does not require the
appointment of counsel in all cases ....28
The court further explained its view in State v. Burnside,29 holding
that the appointment of counsel is within the discretionary powers
of the district court, and unless petitioner shows abuse of that discretion, the failure to appoint counsel is not error.
The stated reasons for such a view are apparently threefold.3 0
In State v. Hizl,31 the court explained that: "Although such a proceeding resembles a criminal action, it is in fact a civil proceeding
in which a defendant is not entitled as a matter of constitutional
right to the appointment of legal counsel." A second reason8 2 is
the limitation to direct appeals found in Douglas itself; and it is
finally reasoned that: "The federal courts have long held that a
defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to counsel in habeas
corpus proceedings or in proceedings on motions to vacate a judg33
ment of conviction."
Post conviction procedures have been previously classified as
civil remedies, 34 and have thus been classified as outside the scope
State v. Craig, 181 Neb. 8, 10, 146 N.W.2d 744, 746 (1966).
29 181 Neb. 20, 146 N.W.2d 754 (1966). See also State v. Williams, 182
Neb. 444, 155 N.W.2d 377 (1967) and State v. Packson, 182 Neb. 472,
155 N.W.2d 361 (1967).
30 The additional specific reason of "only one question of law" in which
counsel would serve no meaningful role was cited in State v. Craig,
181 Neb. 8, 10, 146 N.W.2d 744 (1966); and an underlying reluctance
to depart from such a view is probably also found in the fear that
most of the appeals would be frivolous, and the administrative burden
overwhelming.
31 181 Neb. 680, 684, 150 N.W.2d 217, 219 (1967).
-32"A defendant has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel
in a post conviction proceeding. Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, relates only to the
question as to the right to counsel on his first appeal from an original
conviction of the crime charged." State v. Burnside, 181 Neb. 20, 22,
146 N.W.2d 754, 755 (1966). But see note 25, supra.
33 State v. Burnside, 181 Neb. 20, 146 N.W.2d 754 (1966). But see LaFaver
v. Turner, 231 F. Supp. 895, 898-99 (D. Utah 1964). See also State v.
Dabney, 181 Neb. 263, 147 N.W.2d 768 (1967) and State v. Williams,
181 Neb. 692, 150 N.W.2d 260 (1967).
34 "As said in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 222, 72 S. Ct. 263,
274, 96 L. Ed. 232: 'Unlike the criminal trial where the guilt of the
defendant is in issue * * * a proceeding under Section 2255 is an independent and collateral inquiry into the validity of the conviction.' The
remedy provided by that statute 'is a special civil rather than a
28
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of federal and state constitutional guarantees of the right to counsel
in criminal proceedings. Such a classification is only peripherally
correct, however, as such procedures are now established remedies
for challenging a criminal conviction and are, in fact, more a part
of criminal than civil procedures. In dismissing such a classification,35 and in following the indications of Douglasfor post conviction
procedures, the Supreme Court of California has remarked that: "It
is now settled that whenever a state affords a direct or collateral
remedy to attack a criminal conviction, it cannot invidiously discriminate between rich and poor."3 6 The court went on to use a
"required-standard" type of approach and held that upon a showing
of factual allegations sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing an
indigent would be appointed
counsel-a standard which other
37
courts have since adopted.
It may be true that the discretionary standard approach of the
Nebraska Court will not constitute "invidious discrimination"
against indigents, but note should be taken of the California Court's
comment on this standard. After a thorough examination of the
Douglas case, the court concluded:
Since the questions that may be raised on coram nobis are as crucial
as those that may be raised on direct appeal, the Douglas case precludes our holding that appointment of counsel in 38coram nobis
proceedings rests solely in the discretion of the court.
This interpretation would clearly breathe some added life into the
constitutional aspects of Douglas' effect on post conviction procedure.
criminal proceeding even though it attacks a criminal conviction,'
Taylor v. U.S., 229 F.2d 826, 832 (8th Cir. 164)" Baker v. United States,
334 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1964).
85 "The Attorney General contends that coram nobis is a civil remedy
and that therefore appointment of counsel is not mandatory.... Whatever the label, however, coram nobis 'must be regarded as part of the
proceedings in the criminal case * * *.'... and it is an established
36
37

remedy for challenging a criminal conviction." People v. Shipman,
62 Cal.2d 226, 231, 397 P.2d 993, 996 (1965).
Id.
The Supreme Court of Idaho has since held that
where it appears
that the petition is not frivilous [sic], but presents an issue requiring
...

a hearing, the district court should appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner if he is financially unable to obtain counsel for himself."

38

Austin v. State, 91 Idaho 404, 407, 422 P.2d 71, 74 (1966). The court
in People v. Monahan, 17 N.Y.2d 310, 312, 217 N.E.2d 664, 666 (1966),
put it a bit stronger, in holding: "The question now before us, i.e., an
indigent's right to assigned counsel at a coram nobis hearing, is so
completely circumscribed by recent and well-founded parallel decisions
that it remains only to declare the rather obvious answer that such a
right does exist." See also State v. Randolph, 32 Wis. 2d 1, 144 N.W.2d
441 (1966).
People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 231, 397 P.2d 993, 996 (1965).

COMMVIENTS
Such an interpretation would also seem to be a wise move in
the field of post conviction procedure in light of the history of the
direct appeal. It should be remembered that the direct appeal, like
post conviction remedies, is not a constitutionally required aspect
of criminal procedure. In wording much like that of Douglas the
Court in Griffin v. Illinois 9 applied constitutional considerations to
the direct appeal process as follows:
It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution
to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. See,
e.g., McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-688. But that is not to
say that a State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way
that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of
their poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part
of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or
innocence of a defendant. Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect
persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations.
The Nebraska Post Conviction Act allows an evidentiary hearing to
all who can present factual allegations of some constitutional
merit.40 At this point it is evident that the further provisions of
the act are, in fact, a matter of right for the defendant as provided
by law. The requirements of Douglas would then require that the
district court appoint counsel for indigents.
No court has yet used the Griffin rule on state post conviction
remedies, but any doubts that the Douglas requirements do extend
to post conviction remedies by virtue of the Griffin rationale are
easily resolved by a recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court. In Entsminger v. Iowa,41 the court considered such an extension, and summarized its previous cases as follows:
[I]n Burnes v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 3 L.Ed2d 1209, 79 S.Ct., 1164
(1959), the Court in reaffirming the Griffin rule, held that "once
the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it
may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that
procedure because of their poverty." At 257, (3 L. Ed.2d at 1213.)
In Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, (6 L. Ed. 2d 39, 81 S. Ct. 895
(1961)) the Court, once again considering the question, held that
such principles are not limited to direct appeals but are also
applicable to post conviction proceedings.
This is a somewhat wider reading of the Smith case than some
might ascribe to it, but the Supreme Court in the Entsminger case
does seem to indicate that what has been called the "liberal approach" to criminal procedure will indeed be extended to post
conviction procedures.
39 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1955).
40 NEB.

REv.

STAT.

§ 29-3001 (Supp. 1965).

41 386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967).
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The reasoning of the Griffin rule is perhaps even more persuasive than that of Douglas, but both appear to do considerably more
homage to the concept of justice as she is customarily picturedwith scale and blindfold-than does the Nebraska standard which
seems to posit that an indigent's case does not require aid of counsel
at either the evidentiary hearing or appeal stage. This rationale is
in rather marked contrast to that of Douglas and Griffin.
In light of the reasoning behind the constitutional right to
counsel, and the logic of Griffin that extensions to basic criminal
procedures must respect that right-it would appear prudent for
Nebraska, legislatively or judicially, to require right to counsel for
indigents under the Nebraska Post Conviction Act.
In support of this interpretation, it must be recalled that if the
defendant can allege facts tending to raise constitutional questions
in regard to his conviction he is guaranteed a further hearing and
appeal as surely as he is guaranteed an initial trial and appeal. Thus,
post conviction procedure becomes an important additional step in
the adjudication process, and discrimination on a basis of monetary
considerations cannot be constitutionally justified.
There would also be some logic to a requirement of counsel to
aid on the petition drafting stage,42 but as the factual allegation test
must be met before the defendant may make use of the act, it is
doubtful that counsel would, or could be granted at that stage.43 It
should also be noted, however, that in light of the purpose and
application of the act, it is doubtful if lack of counsel at such stage
will be of much consequence.
42

A recent case attempted to raise the issue of such a requirement, and
counsel for the appellant urged that "[tihe critical time of need for
services of counsel was before the court took up the motion for PostConviction relief." The brief for the appellant concluded that: "Unless
so construed, the provision for the appointment of counsel is devoid
of sense and meaning." Brief for Appellant at 8-9, State v. Carreau,
No. 36644, filed April 10, 1967. The court did not specifically consider
this argument in its opinion but in affirming the conviction of the
lower court, is was mentioned that: "Competent counsel was appointed
for defendant before his arraignment in county court, and defendant
was represented by counsel at all essential stages of his subsequuent
prosecution." State v. Carreau, 182 Neb. 295, 296, 154 N.W.2d 215, 216
(1967) (emphasis added). See also Lake, The Echo of Clarence Gid-

43

eon's Trumpet, 44 NEB. L. REv. 751, 765, 767 (1965), n. 42 and accompanying text.
This question has not been answered specifically, even though the act
provides for legal representation "in all proceedings under the provisions of this act...." In discussing this point, one writer has outlined
the problems as follows: "What remains unclear is whether counsel

COMMENTS
This is so because the act is only intended to affect those whose
conviction is questionable because of the emergence and further
development of evolving areas of constitutional guarantees, 44 and
the bench is surely as aware of such developments as the bar.
Furthermore, the liberal manner in which the bench has granted
petitions4 5 under the act serves to allay any fear that constitutional
guarantees might not develop as fast in Nebraska as in the rest of
the nation.
In the last analysis, however, it would appear clear that the
attitude of the United States Supreme Court in this area gives
ample indication that right to counsel may soon be made explicitly
mandatory for indigents in post conviction procedures. Concluding
on like indications of forthcoming change in the reapportionment
field, Judge Stephen J. Roth noted, in words propitious for this area,
that change was imminent with the following analysis: "It is submitted that the Supreme Court handwriting is on the wall, for
him who will [,] to read. ' 4 6
William A. Harding '69

44
45

46

may be appointed to assist the prisoner in drafting and filing his
'verified motion,' or whether the prisoner must muddle through this
stage of the procedure unrepresented and secure counsel only after
he has successfully negotiated the drafting and filing himself." Lake,
The Echo of Clarence Gideon's Trumpet, 44 NEB. L. REV. 751, 769 (1965).
See note 7, supra.
See note 14, supra.
Marshall v. Hare, 227 F. Supp. 989, 1005 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (dissenting
opinion).

